This paper was prepared as a background paper for the panel on "Global Capitalism and Sustainable Development" in the International Conference on Global Ethos to be held at the United Nations University in Tokyo, Japan, in October 2000. It surveys the major issues involved in defining sustainability, and the relationship thereof to development and the behaviour of capitalist economies. A particular focus throughout, in line with the aims of the conference, is the importance of the fundamental changes in values that are required if sustainability to be achieved and maintained.
Introduction *
A notable feature of the last 50 years has been the growing realisation that we can no longer take the environment for granted. Indeed, although we must continue to depend on the ecosphere as a source of vital inputs and a sink for the by-products of our activities, it has now become clear that we cannot assume an unbounded capacity for either of these features. Unfortunately, much of the analysis applied to both the developed economies and to the question of development has proceeded on the basis that the economy is not fundamentally constrained by its surrounding ecosytem. The revisions required to this way of thinking are profound, and will necessitate a sea change in global values with regard to the relationship of the economy to the environment, the meaning of 'progress', and the conceptions of the 'good life' that are compatible with sustainable economic activity. The difficulties associated with such changes are compounded by the current problems of disparate development and fundamental global inequality. The challenge posed is no less dramatic than the consequences of failure. If we value human existence, we must find some way to recreate the mode of that existence that both raises the prospects of the underprivileged, and is capable of being maintained into the indefinite future.
Sustainability Concepts
A necessary first step in the discussion of sustainable development is, of course, the definition of sustainability. With regard to this question, a range of views is evident in the literature. These views can be organised along a continuum that reflects differences in attitude to certain key assumptions.
At the end of the range most consistent with neoclassical economic theory, its underlying liberal/libertarian ideology, and the optimistic view of the power of human ingenuity, lies the idea of 'weak' sustainability [Pearce and Turner (1990) , Pearce and Atkinson (1993) ]. According to this approach, the total contributions of the ecosphere can be represented as a flow of services from a stock of 'natural' capital. Furthermore, this stock is regarded as substantially substitutable in use for man-made capital (Gutés 1996) . Given this, the notion of sustainability reduces to the attainment of a non-decreasing per-capita consumption path that does not degrade total capital.
The implication of the definition of sustainability as 'weak' is clear: given a sufficiently high degree of substitutability of man-made for natural capital, there is no a priori reason to preserve the natural capital stock. In so far as per-capita consumption can be maintained by replacing natural inputs and functions with man-made processes, the environment in which we live can be allowed to deteriorate indefinitely so long as saving is sufficiently high to allow a corresponding increase in the stock of manufactured capital. 1 Not surprisingly, the notion of 'weak' sustainability has been poorly received by many ecologists and ecological economists. In the first instance, and independent of environmental concerns, the demonstration that much of the discourse concerning aggregate 'capital' is lacking in logical foundation is simply ignored, despite the concessions wrung from leading mainstream economists over three decades ago (Harcourt 1972) . Exacerbating this failure is the acute nature of the valuation and aggregation problems with respect to 'natural' capital: what set of procedures might balance in value terms remaining deposits of oil with biodiversity on the one hand, and the absorptive capacity of the oceans and atmosphere on the other? 2 The problem is rendered more acute by the uncertainty surrounding the definition of appropriate units in which to measure these * The useful comments of Rod O'Donnell are acknowledged by the author. All remaining errors are due solely to the latter. 1. Indeed, some have inferred from the assumption of extensive substitutability that natural inputs are essentially irrelevant to the economic process (Solow 1974) . 2. The commensurability problems are stark even within categories of natural resources. The question of the appropriate 'exchange rate' between similar species is difficult enough even without taking into account the apparent link between biodiversity and environmental resilience. effects, and the possibility that critical threshold levels exist beyond which the resilience of the ecosphere, particularly in relation to the sink functions, is permanently reduced (Rao 2000) .
Closely related to the last point is Georgescu-Roegen's (1975 , 1979 argument that simply inserting natural capital as an additional argument in aggregate production functions ignores the fact that manufactured capital requires for its production flows of natural inputs. The assumption that the substitution process can operate independently of natural inputs reflects what Daley (1999b) labels the 'alchemical' nature of the neoclassical representation of production.
3 Rao (2000) notes the extremely limiting assumptions required to support a rigorous statement of the weak sustainability case in terms of Weitzman's (1976) Net National Product construction. That the coherence of weak sustainability requires foresight of future equilibrium paths, and the constancy of preferences and discount rates, is evidence enough that it is a purely academic construct unsuited to an acceptable analysis of the realities of resource use, and issues of external costs in a world of pervasive uncertainty. 4 Finally, the 'econocentric' basis of weak sustainability (Gowdy and O'Hara 1997 ) is reflected not only in the presumption that only market transactions count as indicators of value, but also in the explicit focus on the maintenance of per-capita consumption as the goal of development. This is not only an excessively narrow account of well-being, but it also fails to take into account that much current consumption behaviour is unnecessary and wasteful in a number of dimensions. The question of what is to be sustained is as important as how to sustain it. Weak sustainability is explicitly tied to the very answer to that question that has produced the current environmental problems.
The inadequacy of weak sustainability points to the necessity of accepting 'stronger' definitions. These typically involve the recognition that natural and manufactured inputs are complements, rather than substitutes.
5 From this, it follows that an economy is only as sustainable (in terms of per-capita consumption or resource-use profiles associated with some idea of a 'good' life) as the limiting factor in the natural/manufactured input pairing. In the relatively 'full' modern world, the limiting factors are clearly on the natural side. Hence, if future generations are to be spared the destructive effects of exhaustion of the source functions and overloading of the sink functions of the ecosphere, it follows that it is the stocks of natural 'capital' that must be preserved. Furthermore, the uncertainty surrounding the critical values of environmental variables, and the possibility of catastrophic and partially irreversible effects associated with crossing such thresholds, implies that policy approaches to environmental issues should be guided by the precautionary principle.
6 This entails proceeding with more caution than might be deemed warranted on the basis of current scientific thinking.
Although stronger notions of sustainability represent the more sensible course in terms of definitions, it is important to note that, even at this stage, the central focus of the conference (values and their articulation, through dialogue, in a global ethos) is relevant. Some have argued that strong 3. The weak sustainability conception also ignores the implications for the sink function of the ecosystem. For example, Sarkar (1999 p97) notes that the extraction of copper from rock containing the mineral at its average crustal abundance requires the mining of 25000 tons of rock per ton of copper obtained. Given the uneven distribution of mineral abundance, and the exponential increase in waste by-products as the grade of ore decreases, it is clear that the substitution of manufactured capital for natural capital may involve the generation of severe environmental stress, unevenly distributed in geographical terms. 4. A failure perhaps illustrated by the tendency for indices of sustainability calculated in terms of the 'weak' concept (Pearce and Atkinson 1993) to imply that the world economy, and those of the industrialised nations, are currently sustainable (Martinez-Alier 1995) . If this were so, the degree of interest in sustainability would appear to be beside the point! 5. The idea of strong sustainability reflects the theoretical innovations of Georgescu-Roegen (1971) regarding the thermodynamic limitations on economic processes. 6 'Catastrophic' in this instance is intended not only in its everyday sense but also more specifically in the mathematical sense associated with catastrophe theory. A 'catastrophe' in this sense is a qualitative discontinuous change in a system that arises from steady changes in underlying variables. For technical details, see Poston and Stewart (1978) . sustainability rests on the assumption that the role of the ecosystem is to contribute to human welfare and, as such, is little different in spirit from the weak sustainability approach (Holland 1999) . The alternative is to value the ecosystem absolutely rather than instrumentally. A central question, then, in value terms is: do we wish to preserve the environment so that our descendants need not lead less enjoyable lives (according to our standards) than ourselves, or do we wish to preserve it because it is simply worth preserving in the least damaged state possible? 7
Attaining and Maintaining Sustainability
Given a commitment to sustainability in something like the strong sense, the next pertinent question is that of how such outcomes are to attained and maintained over time -in other words what is the optimal scale of human activities, especially economic activities (Daly 1991) ? This reduces to the question of managing the ecological impact of human activities, defined as the product of per-capita impact and population. The former represents both the impacts on the source function of the ecosphere associated with our exploitation of materials and other inputs, and the strain placed on the sink functions both at the local level (e.g. emissions and waste products) and at the global level (e.g. global warming). Values are again important to the issue at this point, as the 'received wisdom' to date has been that continuous growth is, and ought to be, the chief macroeconomic aim of any society.
8 A concerted effort to dispel this notion will be required at the grass roots level, in governments, and in the academic institutions that inform them, if sustainable outcomes are to be achieved.
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Although the specification of the optimal economic scale is clearly an incredibly demanding task, the measures suitable for the expression of the overall ecological impact of a given society could still be routinely calculated. An example is provided by Azar et al. (1996) , who develop a set of what they call socio-ecological sustainability indicators. Involved in the set, for example, are indicators relating to lithospheric extraction rates and their cumulative effects, production rates of foreign substances and anthropogenic flows of natural substances (such as CO2), and the impact of human activity on ecosystem productivity (through soil erosion, soil nutrient balance etc). 10 The specification of desired limits to realised values of such indicators, incorporating a bias consistent with the precautionary principle, would be an important step toward attaining a sustainable, optimal scale of economic activity.
The task of meeting such limits requires attending to the two components of ecological impact. These will be dealt with in turn.
(i)
Per-capita impact
As the focus of this panel is on global capitalism and sustainable development, it is pertinent to observe that a powerful spur to reducing the impact of economic impact on the ecosystem is commercial self-interest. Hawken et al. (1999) present an impressive case for the possibilities inherent in what they call 'natural capitalism'. Starting from a position sympathetic to 'strong' notions of sustainability, they outline a range of technological options that radically improve resource productivity (along with concomitant reductions in usage), and eliminate waste and toxic by-7 This question raises the issue of the existence value of environmental components. For a discussion see Aldred (1994) . 8 Daly (1995) reports an occasion on which World Bank Chief Economist Lawrence Summers declared, in answer to a question from Daly, that considering the optimal macroeconomic scale was "not the right way to look at" the problem of sustainability. 9 It has been alleged that economic growth may lead to 'delinking', a decline in per-capita impact (World Bank 1992, Selden and Song 1994) . Such an outcome would lend rearguard support to the growth paradigm. For empirical evidence to the contrary, consistent with 'relinking', see de Bruyn and Opschoor (1997) . 10 Giampietro and Pastore (1999) develop another approach relating specifically to Georgescu-Roegen's (1971) 'entropic' analysis. Rao (2000) discusses a range of more economically focussed measures. products through biomimicry (technological processes that replicate the closed-loop nature of biological systems).
11 Furthermore, they argue for a reorientation toward a service-based economy in which commodities are produced for lease rather than sale (hence shifting the focus to the quality of goods produced rather than the quantity) and investment expenditure dedicated to restoring natural capital.
A common property of the myriad of detailed examples provided by Hawken et al. is the cost effectiveness of the technological changes involved. Each of the examples of actual (as opposed to feasible) innovations they identify is alleged to have dramatically reduced costs, and often to have lead to strong revenue growth. If so, the move toward the reduction of per-capita impact could be driven endogenously by the profit-seeking of firms, a powerful motive force in capitalist economies.
The self-interest of firms could be supported in a number of ways. First, consumer sentiment. Although the idea of 'consumer sovereignty' is largely an invention of mainstream economic thought, it is nevertheless true that consumers may be able to exert pressure on firms by demanding only goods that are produced by processes compatible with 'natural' capitalism. This would require, in part, the values shift associated with support for sustainability in general, as well as some degree of education on the part of consumers, as many of the proposals made by Hawken et al. involve radical innovations in design. 12 To the extent that firms will pursue cost savings, consumers can do their part by providing revenue incentives.
Second, governments can play a two-fold role. On the 'carrot' side, R&D subsidies and tax credits can be geared to product and process development that reduces ecological impact. Information regarding successful innovations could be circulated via government in order to influence and stimulate private research activity within firms. Government scientific agencies can attempt to alleviate the cost of research in the face of uncertainty by undertaking research into various options themselves and making the findings available to industry. In short, promotion of the idea that design and process innovations can be win-win is the key.
However, the chief contribution of government is clearly to bring about a situation in which natural capital is properly valued -it is in this area that the 'stick' will be employed. At present natural inputs and absorptive capacities are either undervalued, or treated as free goods. Worse still, their use is promoted by subsidies paid to resource-extraction firms and industries responsible for emissions and other environmental damage. The first step in properly valuing nature is to eliminate these subsidies so that the correct private costs can begin to be approximated. The next step is to reframe the private decision process by building in the external social costs of such activities according to the 'polluter-pays' principle (OECD 1975) . 13 The most logical and effective means of so doing involves incentive-based instruments such as tradeable emission permits (TEP's) (UNCTAD 1992) . The advantage of auctioning rights to utilise the sink functions of the ecosystem is that it provides for a rationing mechanism that is directly responsive to the level of activity, and which can be operated at relatively low cost once the institutional framework is established. The primary obstacle to a global system is precisely the establishment of such a framework. The most vexing question, directly relevant to the theme of this conference, is that of the distribution of emission entitlements among countries. The polluter-pays principle implies that it is the North that should bear the brunt of the adjustment (receive a smaller share of total entitlements) as a result of its accumulated contributions to environmental problems. By contrast, more superficial notions of 'fairness' would require a distribution of entitlements that equalises net abatement costs as a proportion of GDP.
14 Clearly, a resolution to this distributional problem is a prerequisite for the formulation of a workable international policy framework that adequately addresses both the 11 The need to increase resource productivity was stressed earlier in the Brundlandt Report and by von Weizäcker et al.(1997) 12 The most notable example of which is the 'hypercar', which incorporates an ultralight, moulded-composite body, low-drag design and electric propulsion via fuel-cell batteries. 13 This approach is endorsed in Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration. 14 For detailed discussions of the range of possible approaches, see Rose and Titenburg (1993) and Ringius et al. (1998) . material aspirations of nations, and the multinational character of the world's major corporate entities.
As an adjunct to incentive-based instruments, States may also employ more direct measures in the form of Pigovian eco-taxes (levied on emissions and non-renewable inputs). Such policy measures have the effect of producing pressure in the desired direction on input prices and emission costs, and may be used to offset taxation of labour income at the lower end of the income distribution in order to enhance equity aims. However, the potential of such taxes to produce multiple 'dividends' in this way has been subjected to serious dispute; distortions inherent in existing tax systems may in fact be exacerbated by the imposition of eco-taxes (Goulder 1995) . 15 The piecemeal application of such taxes among countries would also raise serious questions relating to trade. To the extent that the exports of countries more committed to abatement (or with more pressing environmental concerns) would be made relatively more expensive, 'free' trade would lead to an increase in output from less ecologically desirable sources. As this problem is also pertinent to TEP's, it suggests that the global ethos must encompass a notion of 'fair' trade in which the differential costs of abatement and sustainability between countries do not become a source of economic punishment. In other words, are tariffs undesirable when, contra the textbook case, they protect the efficient (ecologically) rather than the inefficient?
16
Beside directing public expenditure into environmental replenishment, perhaps the most significant course of action open to governments is the recasting of the framework used to evaluate macroeconomic outcomes: the national accounts. It has now been recognised for some time that traditional national accounting procedures are inconsistent with sustainability goals. The emphasis on current measures of throughput such as GDP or GNP precludes an adequate treatment of the costs generated by economic activity in terms of environmental damage and depletion, maintenance of the natural capital stock, and wider socioeconomic effects. 17 A range of measures and approaches of varying breadth have been suggested, but no matter which is ultimately adopted, it is clear that unless we change the way in which 'good' economic outcomes are defined, there will be little progress toward sustainable economic practices.
18
The role of values is crucial here, and the task made more difficult by the political inertia generated by 50 years of measuring progress in terms of the growth rates of national accounts measures. Some of the wider alternatives to GDP (as measures of welfare) imply that much of the growth in the industrialised economies in the last 15 years has actually been uneconomic; the welfare gains imputed to GDP growth are entirely offset by negative environmental effects, increasing poverty and inequality, and other costs associated with the growth process. Despite the inherent logic underlying the proposition that different sets of conventions yield different answers regarding well-being, it is surely no exaggeration to observe that convincing the population at large that a fundamental revision of economic history is required is a daunting task.
19 Furthermore, the growth paradigm has been preached to the South, with Structural Adjustment and other Programs designed (ostensibly) to bring about the preconditions for throughput growth. Given the real pain (including loss of life) that has often been associated with such programs, how can the North now declare that the stated goal was, in fact, illusory? The necessity of such a declaration should not blind us to the very real transformation in values that is required if chaos is not to accompany the move 15 The protests against fuel taxes that are currently (September 2000) raging in Western Europe are a graphic illustration of both the political weaknesses of the eco-tax approach, and the extent to which sustainable practices will require a significant shift in values if they are to be successfully maintained over time. 16 Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration holds that national authorities should avoid "distorting international trade and investment" when implementing environmental policies. As is usual in cases where the dogma of 'free' trade reigns, the meaning of 'distortion' in this context is wholly unclear. 17 For instance, Rao (2000) remarks that Exxon's clean-up bill for the Valdez oil spill actually added $3 billion to U.S. GDP! 18 See Rao (2000) for a detailed discussion of such measures, and Costanza (1991) for specific examples. 19 For example, Daly and Cobb's (1989) calculations of their Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare indicates no net improvement in well-being for the U.S. since 1970! toward sustainability.
The change must not, however, be confined to the macro level. It is imperative that consumers in the developed world reassess their consumption habits and their conception of wellbeing. It is a well-established dogma in economic theory that more consumption choices means greater welfare. 20 As a result, we are prone to see the proliferation of consumption alternatives as progress, regardless of whether new goods are true improvements or merely superficially differentiated copies of the old. 21 If we are to curtail needless damage to the ecosystem, we must discontinue the production of essentially useless or unnecessary products. This will not come to pass until welfare is understood in a less narrowly materialistic manner.
(ii) Population
Whereas the task of reducing the per-capita impact of economic activity falls primarily on the North, the population 'problem' is most acute in the developing world. It is here that population growth must be restrained. It is equally clear that this issue involves the conflict of values in its most stark, and potentially insoluble form.
Turning first to practical problems, it is obvious that a commitment to strong forms of sustainability means that the South cannot follow the North and rely on the demographic transition, the negative effect of economic growth on fertility, to moderate population growth. Throughput growth must be restrained rather than maximised. Some have claimed an impossibility thesis with regard to this and other propositions relating to growth in the South (Daly 1988) . The thesis states that the North has already used up resources to such an extent that it will be impossible for the developing countries to attain the same level of per-capita consumption and resource use.
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Alternatives to the simple growth strategy that rely on resource transfers from the North to the South are available, however. The most obvious is the satisfaction of currently frustrated demand for birth control. This will undoubtedly require significant investments in both education and medical infrastructure. The former is crucial given the strong negative link between female literacy and fertility rates, and to provide indigenous sources of medical expertise. The latter is required to reduce infant mortality and to propagate information and materials to those who want them. Redistribution from the North to the South, via global financial agencies, in order to pay for these investments can be seen as the 'global dividend' of resource savings in the industrialised countries. The most important step is to put citizens of countries with fast-growing populations into a position where they can begin to make demographic choices, rather than simply being forced to react to the constraints of their economic environment.
It should not be forgotten, however, that the idea of population management raises questions related to rights that may defy simple resolution. The right to bear children is one that many would regard as fundamental. Hence, many would share the current author's view that market-based approaches to population control, such as Daly's (1977) Tradeable Birth Permits, must be rejected outright as morally repugnant. Yet, procreation is accompanied by externalities; it is not a purely private act. Furthermore, there exist cultural and religious objections to the very idea of birth control that are unlikely to be swayed by essentially utilitarian reasoning regarding the ecological effects of population growth. How a global ethos would incorporate such conflicting values is a question without an obvious answer. 20 This is so even though experience suggests that few, if any, consumers actually explore the entire range of options when making consumption choices. Unconsidered options are clearly irrelevant to welfare. 21 Colours, textures and other surface characteristics are the obvious examples. Technological progress can also be a culprit, however. How much better off is the owner of a voice-activated cellular phone relative to owners of more basic models? Hardin (1991) introduces the idea of 'cultural carrying capacity' to make explicit the role of 'acceptable' standards of living in defining sustainability. 22 The impossibility stems from the effects of extraction flows required to achieve such an outcome in light of the fact that the industrialisation of the North was built on exploitation of the most accessible resources (see note 3).
Development
In light of the impossibility thesis cited above, it is clear that the development of the South cannot follow the path of industrialisation created by the North; it is essential that continuous growth in throughput, consumption and resource use in per-capita terms no longer be viewed as constituent elements of 'development'. Instead, the focus must be on qualitative improvement in the first instance. Thus, development means improvements in literacy, infant mortality, life expectancy, education, the eradication of poverty and so forth. 23 Naturally, this will involve increased resource use in the South, as, for example, the provision of adequate basic infrastructure will be required as a precondition for success in the first instance. As noted above, the reduction in resource use that is the obligation of the developed world can provide the material wherewithal for the required redistribution. Debt relief would allow the internal reallocation of resources away from unsustainable production for export and toward these development goals.
The transformation of domestic industry in the South into sustainable forms faces some obstacles. The first concerns technology transfer. Hawken et al. (1999) list development as one of the goals of the 'natural capitalism' project, but it is noticeable that their discussion of how it is to come about is nebulous compared to their treatment of technological issues. This is not surprising, as the transfer of advanced technologies from North to South can be hampered by the problem of differing capital intensity. Plant and equipment that produces pre-coloured, pre-shaped composite 'hypercar' bodies will have a significantly higher capital-output ratio in, say Mali, than it does in the United States. In simple terms, this means that the sacrifice required to obtain and maintain such equipment, in terms of production of other goods forgone, is much greater in the former case than in the latter. 24 Hence, the environmentally sustainable technologies are likely to be economically unsustainable in the poorer countries of the world. Of course, it is no answer to suggest that the South be allowed to grow economically to the point where this problem is resolved. Both the impossibility thesis and the absurdity of generating ecological damage so that it might then be moderated attest to that.
Compounding this problem is the tendency of multi-national corporations to shift production to the South, where the cost advantages arise out of low wages and the absence of binding regulatory frameworks. In such contexts, 'natural capitalism' technologies may not dominate conventional alternatives in cost terms, especially where technical and other supporting services must be imported. Hence, the free flow of foreign investment into the South will impede rather than promote the move to sustainable production worldwide. A partial response to this problem lies in the promotion of legal frameworks incorporating appropriate labour and social standards, and the embedding of these in trade regulations and agreements. 25 The problem of capital intensity is another that requires attention from international financial institutions, perhaps as an alternative to seeking to make the South merely a profitable target for Northern investment.
The major difficulty associated with bringing development to the South in a globally sustainable manner again lies in the realm of values. The impossibility thesis raises a thorny problem of distributive justice, akin to seeking to divide a pie fairly after one of the recipients has already eaten a large share. It will be difficult enough to persuade the Northern population that resourceintensive consumption is not, after all, the summum bonum vitae. Following decades of proselytising, it will surely be even harder to convince the South that their aspirations in this regard must be abandoned. Yet, this is what global sustainability requires, and development must therefore conform to it.
Sustainability and Capitalism
Finally, it remains to examine the extent to which the requirements of sustainable development are systemically consistent with capitalism. This issue is too often ignored in discussions of this type.
The approach of Hawken et al. (1999) reveals some of the chief difficulties. Capitalist firms are not stagnant organisations; they have an imperative to grow and expand. Hawken et al. acknowledge this by stressing the extent to which the technological innovations they espouse will lead to increased revenues and other indicators of capitalist business success. Yet, they do not indicate what firms will do with their extra earnings. Experience would suggest that, in general, reinvestment and expansion would be the result. However, it is unclear how sustainability is consistent with an economy of expanding firms. The production of ten times as many new items that each uses one-tenth the resources of the old is no gain. An model of capitalism without the growth imperative is needed. The question is whether such a system exists.
The problem reasserts itself at the macroeconomic level. One of the most frequently confirmed empirical facts in economics is that Engel curves are not linear. In other words, the share of expenditure devoted to any particular good declines as income increases. When this result is properly incorporated in a macroeconomic model, it follows that, ceteris paribus, full employment can only be maintained over time if aggregate demand is maintained through the generation of new markets (and thus goods) to replace those wherein demand becomes saturated (Pasinetti 1981) . Hence, there is a systemic requirement for expansion under capitalism if breakdown (increasing unemployment) is to be avoided. 26 However, it is precisely this kind of continuous expansion that is inconsistent with stronger notions of sustainability, and which runs foul of the impossibility thesis with regard to development. If unemployment and economic dislocation are to be avoided, some alternative must be found. Pasinetti (1981) shows that reductions in the length of the working week, and in the ratio of the labour force to population (through a lower retirement age) can act as offsets, in the long run, to aggregate demand failures. 27 Yet, the history of capitalist economies shows that such changes on the labour supply side occur only slowly, and in the face of much resistance from the owners of capital. Furthermore, there are those who argue that the social relations of production under capitalism are such that the eradication of unemployment is not compatible with the operation of the system (Kalecki 1943) . 28 It is certainly not clear how closely a future society that did not rely principally on demand growth for employment purposes would resemble that which we currently recognise as 'capitalist'. In the absence of such offsetting tendencies, however, the basic inconsistency between the requirements of sustainability and the expansion imperative of the capitalist economy remains.
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To recognise this fact is not to conclude, fatuously, that the answer is 'abolish capitalism'. Rather, it is to face the fact that it is jejune, when discussing sustainability, to treat the properties of man-made 26 In a brilliant analysis, Sonntag (2000) demonstrates how the 'micro' and 'macro' perspectives of this problem are linked: competitive innovations by firms in the area of production technology (especially in terms of fast-tomarket strategies) necessitate growth in output, due to their effect on scale and scope economies, and thus demand. The path-dependent nature of innovation thus ensures that competitive firms require an environment of overall growth. 27 Pasinetti (1993) notes that technical progress forces a society to choose between taking the fruits thereof in output, or in leisure. Under capitalism, the choice is skewed heavily, institutionally, toward the former. The choice of leisure over output is, however, more compatible with sustainability. 28 It must be remembered here that 'unemployment' is not a natural phenomenon, but an artefact of a particular configuration of property rights over the means of production, namely one in which 'wage labour' exists. Thus, the problem of permanently solving unemployment in capitalism must be addressed in terms of the systemic characteristics that lead to the presence of unemployment in the first place. 29 Some relief may be found in the shift of values away from consumerism. If a mere increase in the number of consumption alternatives ceases to be identified with a welfare gain, then the expenditure pattern implicit in nonlinear Engel curves may not eventuate. socioeconomic systems as if they were natural and immutable.
A specific criticism of capitalist firms that pertains to sustainability involves their lack of location-specificity. Although the production facilities of a firm must be located in a specific place, the firm, qua a legal entity, need not be so constrained. When the ultimate decision-makers in firms need have no geographical connection to the physical activities of the firm, what incentive do they have to ensure that the deleterious effects thereof on the sink functions of the ecosystem are minimised?
30 Prychitko and Vanek (1996b) suggest that labour-managed firms will be more likely to pay direct attention to ecological effects given the fact that the decision-makers in this instance will live in direct proximity to the firm itself. Hence, a fruitful avenue with regard to the developed world might be for the international financial institutions to encourage the formation of cooperative enterprises. 31 Furthermore, cooperative firms are, contra capitalist firms, indissolubly linked to the communities within which they exist. As such, they are institutions in which communities can express their own values with regard to the distribution of the proceeds of economic activity. To the extent that these are devoted to the service of communal needs, and away from mere individual accumulation of consumer goods, such institutions would support the values shift required for sustainability, and promote the community-mindedness often identified as crucial to the attainment of such outcomes (Daly and Cobb 1989) . 32 Of course, the promotion of industrial democracy is directly, and starkly, incompatible with capitalism. However, the extent to which the same can be said to be true of sustainable development is a question that this conference cannot ignore.
Conclusion
There is no point pretending that easy answers exist to the challenge of achieving sustainable development. What is clear is that until we reformulate the question in terms of 'strong' conceptions of sustainability, no solution will be forthcoming. We cannot blithely assume that things can continue as they are, save for some cosmetic, technological changes. The task of ensuring that human activity does not irreparably degrade the environment's capacity to sustain us requires more than technological answers to alleviate our impact on source and sink, or reallocations of property rights and tax burdens. As important as such endogenous mechanisms and policy settings are, there can be no true solution until we turn away from the 'empty world' vision that underlies much of our political and economic thought, and commit ourselves to aspirations consistent with a world of finitude and limits. Although such a step is undeniably momentous, occasions such as this conference offer opportunities for the process to begin from solid, and reasonable, foundations. 30 In today's world of multi-national enterprises, this point holds with a vengeance. 31 Lending in this case being required to overcome the risk factors, arising out of inequalities in the distribution of wealth, that impede the endogenous formation of cooperatives (Bowles and Gintis 1996) . 32 Bradford (2000) examines similar themes regarding the implications of industrial democracy for the Rawlsian version of the liberal theory of justice.
